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Summary 
 
In the early 1990s, a consensus emerged among the leading experts in the field of small and 
micro business finance. It is based on three elements: The focus of projects should be on 
improving the entire financial sector of a given developing country; a commercial approach 
should be adopted, which implies covering costs and keeping costs as low as possible; and 
institutions should be created which are both able and willing to provide good financial 
services to the target group on a lasting basis.  
The starting point for this paper, which wholeheartedly endorses these three elements, is the 
proposition that putting these general principles into practice is much more difficult than some 
of their proponents seem to believe - and also more difficult than some of them have led donors 
to believe.  
The paper discusses the central issues of small and micro business financing in three areas: 
credit in general and the cost-effectiveness of lending methodologies in particular (Section II); 
savings in general and the role of deposit-taking in the growth of a target group-oriented 
financial institution in particular (Section III); and the process of creating viable target group-
oriented financial institutions in developing countries (Section IV). We argue that donor 
institutions must be willing, and prepared, to play a role here which differs in important 
respects from their conventional role if they really wish to support sustainable financial sector 
development. 
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I. Introduction 
1.  The Conceptual Basis of the Paper 
Although the international donor community has, over the years, made several serious attempts 
to make financial services available to the poor segments of the economically active population 
of developing countries, it is fair to say that something like a consensus has only recently begun 
to emerge. This "new view", in turn, has its roots in a longer tradition of development-finance 
policy and thinking about the broad issues it addresses.
1) 
After the Second World War and into the 1970s, development finance was not particularly 
concerned about poor target groups. This began to change when it become obvious that the 
channelling of massive amounts of foreign funds to large projects in the developing countries 
did not lead to the "trickle down effect" which had been expected. In the early 1970s, the 
concept of target group orientation began to emerge. As far as financing was concerned, 
donors started a wave of small, diverse projects which were meant to make credit available to 
the poor.  
Attempts to set up special target group-oriented, government-owned development banks failed 
almost everywhere. This led to the evolution of a more radical version of the new policy of 
target group-oriented financing. It gained particular prominence in the 1980s and consisted in 
setting up credit programs largely outside of the banking sector as well as outside of the reach 
of governments. This was the heyday of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and self-help 
groups (SHGs) as conduits for donor funds. Their ability to really reach the small and very 
small borrowers, which is unmatched by other types of institutions, was seen as their main 
strength. The main drawbacks of these efforts were that such financing schemes proved 
extremely costly for donors and, at least in some cases, for the borrowers as well; that they 
inevitably failed to reach many members of their target group; and, most importantly in our 
view, that these foreign injections of funds did not lead to the creation of institutions which 
would have been able to play a lasting role in the lives of their "beneficiaries".
2) 
                                                 
1)  For an overview and a critical assessment, see J.D. Von Pischke, (1991), Part II, and Krahnen/Schmidt (1994), 
pp. 9-27. 
2)  For an empirical study of the efficiency of credit-granting NGOs, cf. Schmidt/ 
Zeitinger (1996).   2
Around 1990, the "new view" emerged out of the criticism of this development strategy which 
was  only target group-oriented.
3) In addition to a clear gearing of efforts to poorer target 
groups in urban as well as rural environments, the new view consists in a fruitful combination 
of three main elements: 
(1)  A focus on institution building: Aid efforts should not be directly oriented to the 
provision of financial services to the target group, but rather to the creation of financial 
institutions which would be both able and motivated to cater to the relevant target group 
or groups. Setting up or strengthening such institutions should therefore be the primary 
objective of aid projects in the field of development finance. 
(2) A  commercial approach: The essential elements of a commercial approach are that the 
institution tries to keep its costs as low as possible and is able - and also formally 
permitted - to charge interest rates and fees which are commensurate with its total costs. 
A commercial approach to small and micro-lending is necessary because only an 
instititution which, at least over the medium term, is able to cover its costs can hope to 
remain in existence and to really provide benefits to its clients on a continuing basis and 
at a predictable level.  
(3) A  financial systems orientation: All activities geared to improving the access of poor 
target groups to financial services have to look at things in the broad perspective of the 
entire financial system of the respective country, and this for several reasons. The most 
important one is that an improvement of the overall financial system is likely to bring the 
greatest benefit to the target group over the long term. 
This paper is firmly based on this new view of small and micro business finance. As a result, 
we have attempted to incorporate as much as possible of the financial systems perspective, the 
commercial perspective and the institution-building perspective in the line of reasoning 
presented here.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3)  The new view is alternatively labelled a "financial sector perspective" (Von Pischke, 1991), a "commercial 
approach" (Jackelen/Rhyne 1991) and an "institution building approach" (Krahnen/Schmidt 1994). The 
different labels are not a reflection of substantive differences, but at most a matter of emphasis.   3
2.  The Purpose, Orientation and Structure of the Paper 
We fully concur with the three main elements of the new view and strongly recommend that, in 
their practical work in the field of small and micro business finance, donor agencies and the 
experts working for them should try to make maximum use of the principles which constitute 
the new view. However, we realize that it will not be easy to follow this recommendation. In 
fact, the starting point for this paper is the proposition that putting the general principles into 
practice turns out to be much more difficult than some of their advocates seem to believe - and 
also more difficult than some of them have led donors to believe. Given these difficulties, we 
find it appropriate to strictly limit the focus of this paper to what we consider to be the most 
important questions in the field of small and micro-business financing. The purpose of this 
concentration is to provide an orientation for donor institutions which, through their funding 
decisions, essentially determine the nature of the development projects in the field under 
discussion here.  
The paper contains three main sections, and each one of them deals primarily with one main 
problem. 
Section II discusses the credit business of a target group-oriented financial institution. Here we 
wish to focus on the choice of a credit technology and to demonstrate that the imperative of 
keeping costs low and achieving cost-coverage forces such institutions to adopt a special kind 
of credit technology. This technology is presented and its efficiency is compared with that of 
the "group lending approach". 
The topic of Section III is the provision of deposit facilities to members of the target group. The 
question on which our discussion centers here is, What role should the deposit business play in 
the process of building up a financial institution which is clearly target group-oriented, cost-
conscious and innovative in its efforts to lend to small and micro entrepreneurs? 
Section IV covers institution building. It discusses downscaling and upgrading strategies. The 
main message which we want to convey is that institution-building projects are useful and that 
they can be successful, but that they tend to take much more time and require much more effort 
and commitment on the part of the donors than they usually think or seem willing to 
acknowledge.  
 
   4
 
II. Credit 
1.  Credit Technologies for Target Group-Oriented Lending 
It has long been doubted that it is feasible at all to extend credit to a target group which is poor 
and also rarely has adequate financial records or can furnish conventional types of credit 
security. However, the costs and risks entailed in lending to this target group are not a "given"; 
instead, they are a function of the credit technology which is being employed. One objective of 
this section is to dispel the general doubts concerning lending to the target group. The second 
objective is to undertake a comparison of two "competing" credit technologies. 
Generally speaking, the term "credit technology" covers the entire range of activities carried out 
by a credit-granting institution which have to do with selecting borrowers, determining the type 
of loan to be granted, the loan amount and maturity and the way in which it is to be secured, as 
well as the monitoring and recovery of loans. More specifically, a given credit technology is a 
particular configuration of these features. One can distinguish two classes of credit technologies 
which can be characterized as either "individual-based" or "group-based".  
 
2.  The Non-Conventional Individual-Based Credit Technology 
As the conventional banking technology is asset- and document-based, its applicability in the 
case of the target group of small and micro entrepreneurs is obviously quite limited. We shall, 
therefore, not discuss it any further. The other individual-based credit technology, which we 
shall call the non-conventional credit technology and which is being applied by certain formal 
financial intermediaries and NGOs in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, is 
different from the first one insofar as it has been adapted to the special situation of borrowers 
from the small and micro business sector. It retains the advantages of dealing with each 
individual case separately and is tailored to the situation of the individual borrower, but makes 
a conscious attempt to acquire more information about the borrower by direct inspection and 
personal contact rather than by studying documents. 
The basic advantage of the individual-based credit technology from the point of view of the 
borrower are the low transaction costs which he or she incurs. This is the case because the 
financial institution externalizes neither the risk-induced nor the administrative costs. However, 
from the point of view of the lender, an individual-based credit technology will only prove to be 
competitive if it succeeds in minimizing - or at least reducing to a level which does not   5
jeopardize the financial viability of the lending institution - both the risk-induced costs and the 
administrative costs. How does the non-conventional credit technology attempt to achieve this 
result? 
The default risk is reduced by using non-conventional methods of analyzing the borrowers' debt 
capacity, and by supplying a product that is tailored to the situation of the target group. The 
credit analysis is based on an assessment of the "family enterprise" in its totality, and in 
particular its ability to repay even if the borrowed funds have no impact on the earnings 
potential of the family business. This limits the credit risks and helps to avoid the need to 
monitor the specific uses to which loans are put, which would not be feasible in any event. 
Loan sizes as well as maturities and repayment patterns are also determined in such a way that 
the risk for lenders and borrowers is limited. 
Although an attempt is also made ex ante to ascertain the willingness of the borrower to repay 
the loan, the credit technology still has to include unambiguous incentive mechanisms, 
including penalties, which reduce the moral hazard component of the credit risk after the funds 
have been disbursed, and are nonetheless appropriate to the economic situation of the 
borrowers. This means, among other things, that borrowers are (only) asked to pledge assets as 
collateral which they can easily provide but which would be relatively expensive - or difficult - 
for them to replace if they were seized. With this type of collateral policy, the primary goal of 
the credit-granting institution is to make the borrowers take seriously their payment obligations.  
The non-conventional technology also provides for the utilization of rigorous credit monitoring 
and recovery procedures in the case of arrears, which complements the penalty mechanisms 
mentioned above. 
The credit technology would fail to have the desired effect if it were not backed up by control 
and organizational structures at the credit-granting institution which ensure incentive-
compatible implementation. Accordingly, an institution utilizing the individual-based credit 
technology will make a single loan officer responsible for the entire loan-granting process as 
well as its relationship with the client after disbursement of the funds such that the officer 
develops a quasi-personal relationship with "his" or "her" borrowers which gives him or her 
access to significantly more information about them and their businesses over the course of 
time. The effectiveness of this system can be enhanced by introducing a performance-based pay 
scale for the lending staff.  
A significant reduction in administrative costs is achieved by offering only a limited range of 
standardized products and by introducing as many standardized, routine procedures as possible   6
into the process of credit extension. Special computer software packages are employed which 
have been designed to meet the specific requirements of the credit technology. 
3.  Group-Based Credit Technologies 
The other class of credit technologies are those which involve groups of borrowers - in one 
form or another - in the process of granting and recovering loans. Two variants are of special 
importance here. One involves the use of what may be characterized as "groups as loan 
guarantors"; in the other variant, the group plays more of a social role, and it may be 
characterized as the "group as social network" approach. 
While the utilization of the individual-based credit technology gives rise to specific risk-
induced and administrative costs which the lender should strive to minimize, employment of 
the group-based credit technology seems to imply that the lending institution can avoid 
incurring precisely these kinds of costs by employing group pressure or, as the case may be, 
formal group liability, and by shifting a considerable portion of its administrative costs onto its 
borrowers. 
Therefore, it is not too surprising that group loans to members of economically disadvantaged 
target groups are fairly popular not only among certain new financial institutions and a great 
many credit-granting NGOs; they are also frequently viewed favorably by the international 
donor community. Taking their cue from the Grameen Bank, a number of institutions, above all 
in Latin America, are using some features of this Asian model. Accordingly, given the fact that 
the Grameen Bank is considered to be the most outstanding positive example of a successful 
group-lending program, it is advisable to take a closer look at how this bank really goes about 
its lending activities and how other institutions which apply a group-based credit technology 
differ from this model. 
Most surprisingly, closer inspection reveals that the Grameen Bank does not make use of any 
kind of formal group liability, nor does it rely very much on "peer pressure" - which is alleged 
to be the distinguishing characteristic of group lending systems of all types - to influence the 
borrowers' repayment behavior. In fact, it does not impose any penalties whatsoever on a group 
if one of its members is either unable or unwilling to pay. The group merely has a moral 
obligation to act as a social support system for the group members and to try to induce a 
delinquent borrower to make his payments. Thus, the bank chooses not to exploit the potential 
of the group as a means of enforcing group liability. Instead, it appears that the institution 
prefers a more individualistic form of liability, which is, for example, reflected in its policy of   7
requiring that its individual customers secure their loans with tangible assets whenever this is 
technically feasible.
4) 
Group-based lending approaches have been popular for a number of years in Latin America, 
and more and more credit-granting institutions have developed approaches which appear to be 
similar to the one used by the Grameen Bank without, however, being able to achieve a 
comparable degree of coverage of their target groups. The study on which this paper is based 
discusses in some detail how the Latin American NGOs form borrower groups, the main 
features of their credit contracts, the kinds of problems they encounter with their groups in 
terms of instability, and what they do to mitigate these problems (see Schmidt/Zeitinger 1994).  
In our view, there are three major differences between the group-based credit technology used 
in Latin America and the one which has been developed by the Grameen Bank.  
(1)  Differences in the process of forming groups: This process can take up to six months in 
Bangladesh and is carried out with extreme care although group formation would appear 
to be relatively easy since the target group is defined in extremely narrow terms and most 
of the members of that target group live in small villages with rigid, traditional social 
structures and normally have known each other for quite some time. As a consequence, 
the borrower groups of the Grameen Bank tend to be very stable. In Latin America, on the 
other hand, the process of group formation usually does not take much longer than a week 
although there tends to be less social cohesion among the group members to begin with. 
Consequently, the groups are quite unstable. 
(2)  Differences in the concept of group liability: The Latin American version of the group-
based credit technology adheres much more strictly to the principle of solidary liability 
(indeed, it requires the use of a formal joint and several liability arrangement) than the 
"model" that has been developed by the Grameen Bank.  
(3)  Differences in the cost of loans: The loans granted by Latin American financial NGOs 
using this group-based credit technology rarely carry an effective interest rate of less than 
                                                 
4)  See e.g. Sprodofsky (1994). This "revelation" is certainly not intended to detract from the impressive 
achievements of the Grameen Bank!   8
50% p.a. in real terms, which is significantly higher than the costs incurred by the 
Grameen Bank's borrowers.
5) 
In our view, the group-based credit technology as it is used in most cases in Latin America 
represents a kind of negative, "mirror-image" version of the system used by the Grameen Bank 
which in effect misses the point of what the institution in Bangladesh has done so successfully 
in recent years. Why, then, have so many institutions in Latin America chosen to use this 
approach? We can only surmise that many institutions have adopted it with an eye to the 
preferences of donors who ultimately fund such projects. 
 
4.  Comparing Individual-Based and Group-Based Lending 
This section contains elements of a comparison of the group-based and the "non-conventional" 
individual-based credit technology. The criteria for such a comparison must relate to both the 
supply side, namely the financial instutitions, as well as the demand side, i.e. the borrowers. 
Considered from the point of view of institutions which may use it, a credit technology can be 
called "efficient" if it makes it possible to reach the target group more effectively and to do so 
at a lower total cost to the lending institution than would be possible with other credit 
technologies. This definition focuses on the productivity and the cost-efficiency of the 
technology. 
For the purpose of comparing efficiency, we have compiled and analyzed data from a number 
of formal and semi-formal financial credit-granting institutions in Asia and Latin America 
which cater mainly or exclusively to the needs of small borrowers and use one of the two 
approaches. The institutions included in the comparison are generally considered to be very 
positive examples of institutions employing the respective technology.  
We have derived three hypotheses concerning the relationship between the productivity and 
cost-efficiency of the two credit technologies and tested them (informally) on the basis of the 
data (See Schmidt/Zeitinger 1995). The hypotheses are as follows: 
                                                 
5)  See Schmidt/Zeitinger (1996), where it is reported that a sample of Latin American NGOs which regarded 
themselves as efficiency-oriented offered standard loan contracts to their clients with an average inflation-
adjusted interest rate of 88% (on an annualized basis) in 1991.   9
(1)  Group lending has an advantage over individual-based lending in that at an early stage of 
the life of a credit program or a credit institution, group lending is more productive and 
cost-efficient. 
  The reason for this hypothesis is that, according to the claims made by advocates of the 
group-based lending approach, and based on what we know about the way in which 
groups are in fact being formed in Latin America, the process of setting up groups takes 
less time and is less costly than the corresponding process of learning and of training a 
lending staff which is required in the case of an individual-based credit technology. On 
the basis of the available evidence this hypothesis could not be rejected, so we assume 
that it is valid. 
(2)  In the course of time, however, the productivity and cost-efficiency of an institution using 
group lending increases only moderately, while a bank or NGO lending on a strictly 
individual basis can increase its efficiency rather quickly. 
  The reason for this hypothesis is that the group lending technology shifts a considerable 
part of the burden of selecting customers and monitoring their repayment behavior onto 
the target group and thus "externalizes" bank functions. In so doing, a bank using this 
technology deprives itself of the opportunity to learn and, by learning from its experience, 
reduce its administrative costs. In contrast, the notion of learning, of getting to know 
customers better and developing routine procedures for extending, monitoring and 
collecting loans is at the core of the individual-based lending technology. By comparing 
pairs of institutions of similar age, nature and location, and by evaluating the limited data 
on time series which we were able to gather, we found strong empirical evidence that this 
hypothesis is correct. 
(3)  The efficiency of a relatively old institution using groups is still higher than that of a bank 
or NGO of comparable age which employs the individual-based credit technology. 
  The reason for this hypothesis is that shifting important functions of the financial 
institution onto the borrower groups is assumed to lead to cost savings on the part of the 
institution, as this is, after all, a central part of the rationale of the group lending 
approach. Thus, even a bank which has had substantial experience in the utilization of the 
individual-based credit technology would presumably not be able to compensate for this 
cost advantage of the group approach. Although the evidence on this hypothesis is mixed 
and somewhat inconclusive, there are some indications that it is wrong.   10
Empirical verification or falsification of these hypotheses on the basis of scant information 
concerning only a handful of institutions is, of course, difficult. Nevertheless, we consider the 
results of our preliminary analysis to be highly revealing and practically relevant: If the first 
hypothesis were indeed correct and the third one indeed wrong, this would imply that, due to 
increases in efficiency over time caused merely by institutional learning of the kind that can 
take place with the individual-based technology, an individual-oriented bank would eventually 
outperform a comparable group-oriented bank or NGO in terms of efficiency. What appears as 
a specific strength of the group-based technology at first sight, namely the externalization of 
vital banking functions, turns out to be a weakness in the longer run, as it prevents the financial 
institution from learning and reducing its operating costs. Given a sufficiently long time 
horizon, which is called for in development finance projects anyway, the discounted value of 
the total administrative costs of an individual-based-technology bank would then be lower than 
those of an otherwise comparable bank employing the group-based lending approach.  
The assessment from the perspective of the lending institution has to be supplemented by an 
assessment from the perspective of borrowers. Both groups of institutions which we have 
compared have the same target group and are equally good in terms of accessibility. However, 
with respect to the speed with which a loan can be obtained, flexibility regarding the terms of 
the loan, and most importantly, with regard to transaction costs, the non-conventional 
individual-based technology is definitely superior to all kinds of group-lending technologies for 
the small and micro entrepreneurs. Even if a difference in terms of cost-efficiency at the level 
of the suppliers of credit were not easy to establish, the balance of both kinds of costs would 
seem to show quite clearly that the individual-based non-conventional credit technology is the 
better of the two. Thus, donors should reconsider the preference which some of them seem to 
have for the group lending approach. 
   11
 
III. Savings 
1.  The Relevance of Saving 
Fortunately, saving is no longer "the forgotten half " of development finance (Vogel 1984). In 
order to avoid any misunderstanding of the main proposition which we wish to advance in this 
section, we will begin by strongly emphasizing the significance of saving in a macro- and a 
micro-economic perspective and, at the same time, the significance of deposit-taking both as a 
service to clients and as a source of funds for financial institutions:  
(1)  Seen from a macroeconomic perspective, saving is necessary as it is the basis of capital 
accumulation.  
(2)  Seen from the perspective of the customers, the provision of deposit facilities is a service 
which is needed by all groups in society, and thus they must be offered. Poor people and 
small and micro entrepreneurs also need and demand deposit facilities.  
(3)  Seen from the perspective of all  financial institutions of a given country, deposit 
mobilization is necessary as it provides the funding required for the lending operations of 
the banking system.  
However, it is in the spirit of the new view of small business financing to take a financial 
systems perspective. This perspective provides the straightforward insight that no single 
institution should be looked at - or treated - as though it were the entire system. The three 
arguments in support of the importance of savings apply without qualification to the financial 
sector of a country or a region as a whole. But we do not think that they apply with equal force 
to those innovative urban-based financial institution which direct most of their lending to the 
target group of small and micro entrepreneurs. For them - and their credit customers - 
specialization in lending may be more advisable at least as long as they are still growing 
rapidly. Thus, not all target group-oriented financial institutions must at all times provide 
savings facilities in order to mobilize the bulk of the funds for their lending business from 
depositors, in particular from the members of the target group on which the institution focuses 
its lending operations. 
As neither macroeconomic nor demand-side considerations make it imperative that each 
individual institution develops a deposit business, we must look all the more closely at the   12
supply side and ask why target group-oriented financial institutions should be, or should 
become, "full service banks". The question is worth asking for the simple reason that most 
donor agencies seem to have developed a strong and almost dogmatic preference for target 
group-oriented "full service banks" in recent years. They have even come to consider the model 
of a "full service bank" as an ideal from a development-policy perspective.  
 
2.  Two Models of a Target Group-Oriented "Full Service Bank"  
There are, in fact, two different models of a "full service bank". One model can be called the 
"intra-sectoral full service bank". Such a bank would try to mobilize the bulk of its deposits 
from the same target group to which it directs most of its lending. Some observers would regard 
such a full service bank as the absolute ideal. The relevant question in relation to this model is 
simply: Is it at all a realistic one for an institution which considers poor people, and in 
particular small and micro entrepreneurs, as its target group? 
The other model would be an "inter-sectoral full service bank" which tries to lend to "lower" 
social strata than those from which it collects the bulk of its deposits. The most interesting 
question to be asked in relation to this model is this: Is it good for the members of the target 
group that "their" financial institution tries to mobilize deposits from other segments of the 
local society?  
 
3. Empirical  Evidence 
It seems advisable to take a short look at the available empirical evidence in order to assess the 
feasibility and the advisability of the two models of a "full service bank". Unfortunately, there 
are only a few well-documented case studies of successful savings programs at target group-
oriented financial institutions. The relevant literature, fascinated as it is by the sheer ability of 
small savers to put aside money, rarely contains hard empirical data which would allow one to 
evaluate the concept of a target group-oriented "full service bank". Such data would tell us 
about  
(1)  the size distribution of savings as an indicator of where the deposits come from;  
(2)  the costs - in terms of both interest costs and administrative costs - of mobilizing savings 
from different groups of depositors;    13
(3)  the stability of the deposit base; and  
(4)  the relationship between the volume of deposits and the volume of lending. 
We have looked at empirical material on the deposit mobilization efforts of some well-known 
development finance institutions in Asia and Latin America. Certain Asian institutions, like 
BKK and the Unit Desa Program in Indonesia, have the reputation of being very successful in 
this field. But considered in detail, the success of BKK is quite limited as far as voluntary 
savings are concerned. BKK's mobilization of small savings is insufficient to fund its lending 
operations to any appreciable extent. Unit Desa is more successful. But there appear to be 
several interesting reasons for its success. First of all, its deposits are guaranteed by the big 
government-owned bank BRI, of which the Unit Desa Program is a part. Secondly, it offers 
considerably higher interest rates than, say, BRI itself, thus raising the possibility that many 
deposit customers of BRI may simply have shifted their deposits to another part of the same 
conglomerate. In macroeconomic terms as well as in terms of improving the supply of deposit 
facilities, the value of these savings services may therefore be limited. Although we do not have 
data on administrative costs, the high interest costs alone would support the hypothesis that 
mobilizing savings is an expensive proposition in even in those parts of Asia where staff costs 
are relatively low.. 
The experience of certain target group-oriented financial institutions in Latin America points in 
the same direction: even when normal market interest rates, and rates which are positive in real 
terms, are offered, voluntary saving by the members of the target group contributes only a 
small volume of deposits. Thus, a rapidly expanding target group-oriented financial institution 
clearly needs alternative sources of funding. If it seeks to obtain these additional funds on the 
local market for deposits, it will find it difficult to quickly attract savings capital from members 
of the middle class even if it offers a substantial interest rate premium. This is so because it 
takes a new independent bank several years to gain the trust of potential savings customers and 
because competition among financial institutions for their business is intense in cities and for 
this group of clients.  
The Peruvian municipal savings banks are an interesting case here and one which shows how 
difficult it is to implement the model of an inter-sectoral full service bank. Over the last few 
years, these institutions' savings deposit volume has been equivalent to more than 100% of their 
outstanding loans. The savings banks' growth in the early 1990s has been primarily a function 
of their ability to attract savings deposits, and this has in fact proved to be a rigid constraint to 
the growth of these intermediaries. Indeed, a considerably higher growth rate would have been   14
needed in view of the credit demand of the target group as well as the economies of scale which 
could have been exploited with a stronger funding base.
6 
The case of the Peruvian municipal savings banks provides the rare opportunity to say 
something about the administrative costs of mobilizing savings. In a study prepared in the 
context of GTZ's support to the Peruvian savings banks, Rochus Mommartz finds that in 1993 
the full costs of savings mobilization were in excess of 10% (per year) for the stock of total 
deposits.
7 A large part of these deposits came from big savers and institutions. The full costs of 
mobilizing small savings, defined as savings deposits of less than US$ 500, amount to a 
surprising 40% per year - despite the fact that these banks have, with foreign assistance, gone a 
long way in introducing cost-saving administrative procedures and that they make ample use of 
electronic data processing techniques.    
 
4. Implications 
The evidence provides additional confirmation of what has, by now, become common 
knowledge: there is indeed a demand on the part of small savers for appropriate deposit 
facilities. And this implies, as a kind of "moral imperative", that a target group-oriented 
institution - as well as the people who run it and the donors who support it - must seek to ensure 
that there is a supply available to meet this demand.  
However, in marked contrast to the situation which prevails in many rural areas, where one 
specific development finance institution is often the only one that is at all accessible and that 
could therefore offer formal deposit facilities, in the urban environments in which most of the 
financial institutions that lend to small and micro entrepreneurs operate, there is in most cases a 
supply of deposit facilities available "on the market". Therefore, these institutions need not, and 
should not, be burdened and constrained by the expectation of donors that they themselves 
should also provide - complicated and costly - deposit services for borrowers from their main 
target group at an early stage of their lives as institutions, and they should not be forced to 
restrict the scale of their credit operations to that dictated by the volume of funds generated by 
their mobilization of small savings.  
                                                 
6   See Lepp (1994, pp. 222-280), and most recently Bredenbecker (1997). 
7)  See Interdisziplinäre Projekt Consult (1994). The study of Bredenbecker (1997) supports these findings with 
more recent data from selected Cajas.   15
A possible objection to this proposition is that there are synergies between the lending and the 
deposit business of a bank. But if we look back at the discussion presented in Section II above, 
it can easily be seen that if credit is granted to the target group in such a way that lending costs 
are kept down, there will not be any appreciable potential for synergies. And even if the 
synergies existed, they would most likely not be sufficiently important to offset the high costs, 
and they could not solve the problem posed by the limited quantity of funds mobilized in the 
form of small savings. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that the model of an "intra-
sectoral full service bank" for the target group is in fact an illusion and should be abandoned as 
the "ideal" of donor agencies. 
Thus, what remains to be discussed is the model of the "inter-sectoral full service bank". What 
are the implications of gearing savings operations mainly to middle- and upper-class depositors 
in terms of the quality of the lending operations, which are directed mainly at lower-class 
borrowers?  
The most important consequence of efforts to attract savers from the middle class is that the 
institutions incur high funding costs as middle-class savers often must be induced to switch 
banks. Savings from the middle class are also relatively more volatile and force the institution 
to hold higher liquidity reserves, thus leaving less of their funds for lending. In addition, the 
mobilization of a sufficient volume of savings from the middle class also tends to induce the 
institutions to make changes in their credit business and in the general orientation of their 
business policy as they must have at least some of the attributes of a "normal" full service bank 
in order to be attractive to these customers. Thus, securing the business of middle-class savings 
customers cannot be expected to lead to an increase in the quality of a target group-oriented 
intermediary's credit business with its primary clientele. With respect to the way in which a 
target group-oriented intermediary defines its basic mission as an institution, one possible 
consequence of this attempt to accomodate the banking needs of a different social class is a 
gradual shift away from the target group it was originally designed to serve. A similar case can 
be made against efforts to attract big savers, including institutions. Thus, the "inter-sectoral full 
service bank" is also a concept which proves to be difficult to implement on an economically 
sound basis and one which is questionable from a development-policy standpoint. 
This of course raises the question of where the bulk of the funding required for onlending will 
come from. There is no getting around the fact that some kind of large deposits or other funds 
must be attracted. The precise extent to which large local deposits should also be sought will be 
a function of the institution's size and age. We feel that new and clearly target group-oriented 
institutions should be able to rely primarily on long-term borrowing in the framework of 
bilateral and/or multilateral Financial Cooperation programs, which makes their funding much   16
more predictable and reliable. In view of the total costs of other sources of funds, it is evident 
that access to foreign aid funds at normal, i.e. market-oriented, rates is in itself a valuable form 
of assistance for the institutions which we are considering here. There is no need to provide 
these funds at concessionary rates. Of course, foreign funding creates a form of dependence. 
But overall we feel that this dependence has fewer negative consequences for the consistent, 
long-term target group-orientation of the institutions than a dependence on the savings deposits 
of other social strata.   
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IV. Institution  Building 
1.  Assumptions and Evaluation Criteria 
A strategy of development finance as institution building is based on three assumptions: 
(1)  The economic and social situation of the target group can be improved if more and better 
financial services are offered to them. 
(2)  Providing more and better financial services requires that there be institutions which can 
supply these services on a continuing basis and which are motivated to do so. 
(3)  An institution can provide adequate financial services to the poor only if it is financially 
viable, or can at least become financially viable over the medium term. 
In an institution-building perspective, financial institutions should meet two requirements. They 
should be target group-oriented and they should be financially sound. These two requirements 
are not in conflict in the long run, although there may well be conflicts in a short-run 
perspective. 
In accordance with the general thrust of our paper, this section will concentrate on an issue of 
particular importance and practical relevance from a donor perspective: How can viable 
financial institutions be created, and what does this require in terms of donor support? The 
general message of this section is that institution-building projects are so worthwhile - and so 
difficult - that it seems to be advisable for donors to treat them as projects in their own right and 
not to consider institution building merely as something which is added on to projects which 
basically have a different focus.   
 
2.  Selecting Partner Institutions 
This section discusses whether particular types of institutions are, by their very nature, 
especially appealing, or especially likely to be unsuitable, as partners for institution-building 
projects. The ideal institution which donors would want to select or, as the case may be, create 
as a partner institution would be socially close to the target group; professional like a bank and 
therefore able to keep its costs relatively low; on good terms with, but not too close to, the 
respective government; and efficiency-oriented without being profit-oriented.    18
Traditionally, donors have treated the type of partner organization with which they would be 
willing to cooperate simply as a given. In an explicit institution-building approach, the selection 
of a partner institution is regarded as a problem of choosing among various alternatives mainly 
on the basis of the first two criteria mentioned above, i.e. target group-orientation and 
professionalism.  
A crucial aspect of partner selection is the ownership and governance structure of a potential 
partner institution. Institution building typically entails the task of finding a suitable owner or 
creating an ownership position. This task consists of assigning the function of being responsible 
for the project to some specific person or institution. We will call this person or group of 
persons or institution "the owner". In doing so we employ a functional or economic concept of 
ownership.
8) The owner in this broad sense assumes, in the developing country, general and 
ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of the project. Ownership in this sense does not 
necessarily imply legal ownership, but legal ownership may be the basis of functional 
ownership; and, of course, a private commercial bank or the government of the respective 
country can be an owner, too. How problematic the implications of private or public ownership 
will prove to be depends in large part on the governance structure. The governance structure 
consists of the specific regulations which define the responsibilities and powers of the owners 
in relation to the project and the local institution which carries it out.
9) 
It is important to point out that the governance structure of the partner institution cannot, and 
should not, be treated as a given but designed carefully in the context of setting up the project. 
This is why there are no a priori grounds for considering only certain types of institutions - with 
certain ownership and governance structures - as eligible and suitable partners and "objects" of 
institution-building projects. In particular, neither government-owned banks nor private 
commercial banks nor NGOs should be ruled out as partners, although it will probably be more 
difficult to shape the governance structure in an appropriate way with these kinds of owners 
than, for example, in cases where an NGO is the partner institution.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8)  For a detailed study of this concept of ownership, see e.g. Fama/Jensen (1983). 
9)  The concept of "governance structure" which we use in this paper is influenced by the writings of 
O.E.Williamson; see e.g. Williamson (1985), pp. 64-84.   19
3.  "Downscaling": How to Make a Financial Institution More Target Group-Oriented 
Downscaling as one of the standard strategies in the field of financial institution building
10) 
presupposes that there is a formal financial institution which could at least in principle provide 
financial services, especially credit, to the target group, but has so far not served this segment 
of the market, and whose owners and/or management would be willing to engage in this new 
activity.  
The financial sector reforms that have been initiated in many countries during the last decade 
have created an environment which makes the provision of financial services to the 
entrepreneurs from the small business community, if not an attractive proposition, then at least 
conceivable from the point of view of commercial banks. So there are now market forces which 
would in principle induce the existing banks to go "down market" in their efforts to expand 
their customer bases. As - and where - these forces are still weak, it may be worthwhile to 
strengthen them through complementary incentives and to induce formal sector institutions to 
serve the financing needs of the target group on an increasing scale.  
There are certainly banks which will, over the medium to long term, adopt, or develop on their 
own, the credit technology and the organizational structures needed to serve this new type of 
client. And it is precisely these banks which are most likely to be interested in becoming 
partners in a downscaling project. This raises the question of whether it is legitimate from a 
development-policy standpoint to accelerate a process which will take place anyway. Our 
answer to this question is clearly affirmative: if a development project speeded up this process 
in a bank with a large branch network by five years, many small entrepreneurs could get access 
to formal credit five years earlier.  
On a practical level, the concerns which even innovation-minded banks may have with regard 
to the risks and costs of small-business and informal-sector lending are an obstacle to the 
successful implementation of a downscaling strategy. There is in the meantime a sizeable body 
of empirical evidence to the effect that loans to micro enterprises can indeed exhibit lower 
arrears and default rates than loans to large enterprises, provided that a suitable incentive 
structure is in place and that an appropriate credit technology is employed. Downscaling 
requires, first of all, that this empirical information be made available to the prospective partner 
institutions. 
                                                 
10)  On the standard classification of institution-building strategies (and its deficiencies), see Krahnen/Schmidt 
(1994), pp. 81-86.   20
The core of the donor activities in a downscaling project relates to the transfer of a lending 
technology like the one described in Section II above, and to the considerable start-up costs of 
introducing such a technology and implementing the organizational structures which this 
technology presupposes. It is precisely these "start-up costs" which may pose an almost 
insurmountable obstacle to the initiation of small and micro lending activities by institutions 
that are in principle willing to do so. International donor organizations should be prepared to 
provide short-term support to enable participating institutions to overcome their reservations. 
Such assistance, which amounts to a short-term subsidization program, would not only provide 
incentives for a bank which is generally willing in principle but still reluctant in practice, but it 
should also ensure that the start-up costs are not passed on in full to the institution's small and 
micro credit customers, even though in some cases this would be feasible.  
The practical experience which the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are currently acquiring with what has in the 
meantime become an explicit downscaling strategy illustrates the potential of, and the problems 
posed by, downscaling. The strategy appears to work well now. Nevertheless, in the beginning 
a great many reservations had to be overcome at the level of the donor institution, the 
participating banks and the respective governments. As an outcome of a lengthy learning 
process, the donor institutions are now less concerned than they were initially about the fact 
that, in the context of the cooperation program, they do indeed interfere with the internal 
structure of the participating banks to a substantial degree. 
 
4.  "Upgrading": How to Build an NGO and Turn It Into a Small Bank 
4.1  The Focus of the Discussion in this Section 
In this section, we present some stylized facts relating to the process of how an institution 
which tries to concentrate on providing credit to small and micro-scale businesses is born, 
grows up and becomes a formal financial institution with the potential to play a lasting role as 
an element of its country's financial system and as a provider of financial services to persons 
who have traditionally not had access to formal sector credit. In the longer paper whose 
findings are summarized here, we illustrate the upgrading strategy with a case study which is 
based on the experience of GTZ, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation, gained in 
specific projects in Latin America with the strong support of the Microenterprise Division of 
the IDB. In that case study, and also in this section of the present paper, we wish to convey 
three messages:   21
(1)  Creating or supporting an NGO and converting it into a formal institution with a 
consistent target group orientation is a process which takes a long time to complete. 
During this timespan the institution has to be able to rely on continuous support of the 
relevant kind from the donor or, as the case may be, donors. 
(2)  The most crucial aspects of the process are finding the appropriate combination of 
technical and financial assistance, and ensuring that the different forms of support, and 
especially the provision of funds for onlending, are forthcoming at the right time and in 
the right quantities. 
(3)  The process of building up a financial institution should lead to a situation in which the 
institution's operating income is sufficient to cover its full costs. There is no way around 
the fact that, before this stage is reached, there is a need for the donor(s) to subsidize the 
emerging institution. And even in the final stage, the operating costs, which by then will 
be passed on completely to the institution's customers, are still likely to be high by 
conventional standards. 
For ease of exposition - and because this proves to be advisable in practice - we assume that the 
partner organization is, or will be, an NGO. This is, after all, the typical case. In cases where 
this is not so the substance of our arguments still applies.  
 
4.2  The Creation of a Financial NGO 
In the first phase, an NGO is created or, as the case may be, modified. Four elements are 
needed in order for this to take place. These four elements have to be designed in a very careful 
manner and, typically, with considerable involvement of the relevant donor or donors. These 
are the four elements:  
(1)  A legal form: The institution should be a non-profit organization (NPO), preferably 
constituted under private law. Its formal status should be such that the institution is to a 
certain degree independent of the people behind it, and is legally in a position to conduct 
serious lending business and also to receive donations from foreign institutions. These 
considerations make the legal form of a foundation more advisable than the alternative 
form, which would be an asssociation. 
(2)  A governance structure and by-laws: At the heart of the governance structure is the 
definition of the institution's mission. In our case, it consists in providing appropriate   22
financial services to a specific target group on a financially sound basis. In the by-laws, 
the mission should be formulated explicitly, and expressed in operational terms to the 
greatest degree possible. 
  The governance structure gives a board of trustees supreme authority to determine the 
institution's business policy and ultimate responsibility for internal control, yet provides 
for its business operations to be run by a management (preferably a team) which must 
perform its functions with a high degree of professional competence and whose members 
should not simultaneously sit on the board of trustees.  
(3)  Key individuals: A foundation's governing body is its board of trustees. It is composed of 
individuals who are ultimately the project partners. In its composition, the board should 
above all reflect the interests and objectives which will shape the character of the future 
financial institution. Ideally, it should include a number of individuals with a successful 
track record in business, some with experience in banking, and others whose experience 
lies more in the field of social services. 
(4)  Money and commitment: With this type of donor-induced NGO it is neither necessary nor 
desirable for the initial capital to be raised by the founders and/or board members 
themselves, and this for two reasons. Firstly, very few of the people who have the 
qualifications required for board membership would be capable of providing a sizable 
contribution to the sum of money which the NGO will need very soon after the start of its 
operations. And secondly, significant disparities in terms of the individual capital 
contributions would tend to rob the group of its all-important internal cohesiveness. This 
has an important implication: in order to guarantee from the outset that all members of the 
board of trustees enjoy equal status, it is essential that the start-up and original 
endowment capital be provided by a donor organization (albeit subject to conditions). 
4.3  The Growth and Transformation Process 
Assuming that a new NGO has been set up, or, as the case may be, that an existing NGO has 
been chosen as the basis for the project and transformed to the extent that this appeared 
advisable, the following scenario illustrates the possible economic and technical development 
of a - largely donor-induced - financial NGO. The scenario, which is described in detail and 
backed up by specific figures in the main text of the study (Schmidt/Zeitinger 1994, sect. 3.2), 
shows the sequence of individual steps and the extent of the institution's need for funds for 
onlending, as well as the optimal timing for such injections. These funding needs should be   23
covered by the donor or donors in addition to the pure technical cooperation component they 
provide. 
The scenario covers a time span of ten years. The first four years are the time needed for the 
NGO to reach financial sustainability, and thus a situation in which transformation into a formal 
financial institution is advisable and possible. The remaining six years can be roughly divided 
into a phase of rapid efficiency growth and a subsequent phase of slower growth in efficiency. 
From the tenth year on, further growth is assumed to be possible only by a purely quantitative 
expansion of operations. 
During the first year the institution's lending operations will be on a small scale, with a small 
portfolio and a small number of employees, each of whom is responsible for only a small 
number of customers and a limited portfolio. The funds used for lending are essentially the 
endowment capital. The initial loans are very small, not only because of the particular target 
group involved, but also because the institution needs to exercise caution while learning to deal 
with the new borrowers. Despite high interest income of 40% p.a. on the average outstanding 
portfolio, the institution will not be able to cover its costs during this first year. The technical 
assistance component during the first year, as well as during the two following years, should 
include support by several international and local experts and the donation of computer 
hardware and fixed assets. 
In the second year it will already be possible to treble the volume of lending, since both the 
absolute number of staff members and their efficiency will have increased. The new institution 
uses a lending technology like the one which we have called the non-conventional technology 
and described in Section II above. It is the specific advantage of this lending technology that it 
enables the institution and the people working in it as loan officers to learn from experience, 
and by so doing to achieve a rapid and substantial increase in productivity.  
Now that the institution is more experienced in working with the target group, the average size 
of the loans will rise slightly. During the second year, the institution must receive additional 
funds from the donor or donors in order to secure its growth and productivity increase. But this 
time the funding should take the form not of a grant but of an interest-free loan.  
The third year will see another large increase in the number of borrowers, and they can be 
served more effectively due to the opening of new branches. Average loan sizes and maturities 
will again rise slightly. A combination of the increased number of employees, the further 
improvement in their efficiency and the rise in the average loan amount, together with a 
constant level of interest rates, leads to an earnings situation which, for the first time, enables   24
the institution to cover all its operating and risk-induced costs. In order to ensure that the 
institution grows at as fast a rate as is technically possible, it needs to receive an additional 
injection of funds from outside in the form of a "soft" loan (e.g. 6% p.a. in US$). 
In its fourth year the NGO achieves a breakthrough in financial terms en route to becoming a 
cost-covering financial institution. In this phase, it is strongly recommended that the financial 
NGO initiate the transition to a formal-sector financial intermediary and change its legal 
structure to that of a corporation, as the legal form of a foundation will pose an obstacle to 
receiving the funds it needs in order to safeguard its future growth prospects. Its funding needs 
from year 5 on can, and should by all means, be met by loans provided by international 
development institutions at their normal "commercial" rates. From year 4 on and with a 
portfolio size of more than US$ 10 million, the combined administrative and risk costs of the 
institution will drop to below 20% and slowly approach 12% p.a. 
As set forth in detail in the numerical example in our study, the original endowment capital of 
the foundation, together with the donations of PCs and other fixed assets, will form the equity 
base required for the establishment of a formal financial institution - or part of it. The 
foundation, the original NGO, becomes the (principal) owner of the bank, in which the donor 
organization(s) can (and should) now also acquire a formal stake by converting a portion of the 
soft loan provided in year 2 into equity. 
Once a bank has been founded, the focus of the technical assistance component can be 
gradually changed and shifted to other activities, e.g. the launching of a deposit-taking 
business. As we have demonstrated in Section III above, the deposit business should be 
developed gradually and with due consideration being given to its costs. The deposit business 
should be seen primarily as an activity that is designed to provide a service to the customers of 
the bank. The consideration that opening up this second line of business will convert the 
institution into a "complete", and thus a "proper", bank should be of only secondary 
importance. And during this phase of the institution's development, the role of deposits - in 
particular in so far as they come from the target group of small and micro businesses - as a 
source of loanable funds should not be overestimated.  
 
5. Implications 
On the basis of practical experience, we think that the entire process of first creating an 
institution, then bringing it up to a level at which it can cover its costs, and finally converting it 
into a real formal bank without giving up its target group orientation, which we have attempted   25
to describe, represents a realistic approach.
11 But it requires a long-term vision and a long-term 
commitment on both sides. Therefore, donors who want to be partners and supporters of this 
process have to be prepared to play a more lasting and, at the same time, more flexible role and 
to make their own future behavior more predictable and reliable for their partners from the 
developing countries than they are used to doing, and also to introduce a greater element of 
predictability and commitment than they would really like to. After all, the long-term 
involvement, which seems to be necessary, unfortunately also creates incentives and 
opportunities for the local partners to abuse the commitment of their foreign partner. The only 
realistic option which we see for keeping this problem under control is a degree of active 
participation of the foreign partner in the basic decisions of the local partner which is also not 
customary and about which donors - and others - may also have certain reservations.  
We want to conclude the paper by pointing out four widespread deficiencies in the way that 
donor institutions consider and handle institution-building projects. These observations are 
based on our consulting experience gained in cooperation with several major donor 
organizations. The general thrust of our critical remarks is that donors tend to exhibit a certain 
reluctance to consider institution building projects as a genuine and legitimate type of project 
and to take them as seriously as they need to be taken. 
(1)  Some donors seem to feel that it is difficult to justify pure institution-building projects in 
the field of finance, and more specifically in conjunction with the provision of credit to a 
target group which is difficult to deal with. As a consequence, they quite frequently 
incorporate elements of direct support for the target group into an institution-building 
project, even if these elements water down the project strategy and lessen its chances of 
success. Overly rigid requirements stipulated by donors with respect to loan sizes or 
interest rates are features of this tendency to furnish direct support to the target group 
which undermines the institution-building effort.
12) 
(2)  In practice, some donors burden institution-building projects with multiple and 
inconsistent objectives. In part, this tendency seems to be grounded in the assumption that 
creating an institution and transforming it into a viable and professional financial 
                                                 
11   Real financial institutions which have successfully completed this process are Financiera Calpiá in El Salvador 
and Banco der los Andes in Bolivia. 
12)  In contrast to those requirements which are mentioned in the text, performance requirements which put 
pressure on the partner institutions to bring their costs down to a certain level would be in the spirit of the 
institution-building approach.    26
intermediary is not a particularly difficult task, leaving the project management staff or 
the institution itself with plenty of capacity for doing other things at the same time. The 
preference on the part of donors for an "integrated promotion" of small and micro-
business people as well as a tendency to demand too early that their partner institutions 
become something like "full service banks" are manifestations of this widespread miscon-
ception. 
(3)  Many donors follow a general policy of very limited intervention. As a matter of 
principle, there can be no doubt that the optimum is as little intervention as possible. 
However, in the context of building financial institutions, the real issue is how much non-
intervention is feasible if the objective of the project is still to be achieved. In our 
experience, institution-building projects require a much higher degree of intervention and 
long-term commitment on the part of the donors than other types of projects. 
(4)  A certain uneasiness about the responsibility they have in the context of an institution 
building project is probably the reason why donations and loans play a much bigger role 
in such projects than equity. Donors should understand that equity is in many cases the 
appropriate financial instrument for building up an institution. They should not be too 
concerned that, by providing equity where this is called for, they become owners, and 
thus "responsible".
13) In fact, their position is very much like the position of an owner in 
the first place, and they in any case assume responsibility for the success of the projects 
which they support. 
                                                 
13)  See Schmidt/Zeitinger (1996) for a detailed discussion of why donors should take seriously, and live up to, the 
responsibilities which they incur in their role as de facto owners of many of the projects which they support.  
References 
 
BREDENBECKER, Kirsten (1997): Savings Mobilization: Lessons from the Peruvian Savings 
Banks in Trujillo and Sullana, Savings and Development, Vol. 21, pp. 87-109. 
FAMA, Eugene; JENSEN, Michael (1983): Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-326. 
INTERDISZIPLINÄRE PROJEKT CONSULT (1994): Eficiencia económica de las Cajas 
Municipales de Ahorro y Crédito (CMAC) del Perú, Frankfurt/M. 
JACKELEN, Henry R.; RHYNE, Elisabeth (1991): Towards a More Market-Oriented 
Approach to Credit and Savings for the Poor; Small Enterprise Development  Vol. 2, No. 
4, pp. 4-20. 
KRAHNEN, Jan Pieter; SCHMIDT, Reinhard H. (1994): Development Finance as Institution 
Building - A New Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Westview Press, Boulder. 
LEPP, Anja (1994): Finanzzsektorpolitik und der Zugang klein(st)er Unternehmen zu 
Fiinanzdienstleistungen - Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel von Peru. Diss. Univ. 
Frankfurt/M. (Germany). 
OTERO María; RHYNE, Elisabeth (1994): The New World of Microenterprise Finance - 
Building Healthy Financial Institutions for the Poor, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, 
CT. 
SCHMIDT, Reinhard H.; ZEITINGER, Claus-Peter (1994): Criticial Issues in Small and 
Microbusiness Finance, mimeo IPC, Frankfurt 1994 
SCHMIDT, Reinhard H.; ZEITINGER, Claus-Peter (1994b): The Efficiency of Credit-Granting 
NGO in Latin America, Savings and Development, Vol. 20 (1996), pp 353-384.  
SPRODOFSKY, Gabriela (1994): Grameen Bank - A Case Study, mimeo, Berlin. 
VOGEL, Robert C. (1984): Savings Mobilization: The Forgotten Half of Rural Finance, in: 
Adams, D.W./Graham, D.H./Von Pischke, J.D. (eds.): Undermining Rural Development 
with Cheap Credit, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 248-265.  
VON PISCHKE, J.D. (1991): Finance at the Frontier - Debt Capacity and the Role of Credit in 
the Private Economy; EDI Development Studies, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
WILLIAMSON, Oliver E. (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New 
York, NY 
 